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With the increasing complexity of affairs in our modern com-
mercial and industrial society, the need for increasing the security
of transactions and acquisitions becomes more acute. One sign
that this need is being felt is the growing dissatisfaction with the
manner in which the jury is exercising the extravagant powers
granted to it during an age when the economic interests were
relatively simple and the jury was looked upon more as a bulwark
against tyranny and corruption than as an efficient instrument
of justice according to law. There can be little doubt that the
fact that the plaintiff happens to be indigent or that the defendant
is personally unpopular or is a corporation, often has far greater
effect upon the jury than the abstract charge of the trial judge.
The writer purposes in the present paper to discuss the develop-
ment of the law relating to the submission of special interroga-
tories to juries, in order to ascertain to what extent this method
is effective in confining the jury to its legitimate function as trier
of disputed facts.
For centuries the great check on the jury was the attaint.1 If
the verdict was wrong the jury was subject to attaint, whether
the error was in finding the facts or in determining their legal
consequences. As it was palpably unfair to subject the jurors
to the severe punishment of attaint for a bona fide error of law,
they were given the privilege of returning a special verdict in
civil cases, at an early period in common law history.2  There can
be little doubt that the jury's fear of the attaint was far more
potent in developing the special verdict than any feeling that they
were incompetent to understand the law or to apply it to the facts.
After the harsh and cumbersome attaint had become unworkable,
the judges tried other means of mitigating the injustice resulting
from verdicts which were clearly contrary to the law and the
weight of the evidence. The most important of these was the
growing practice of granting new trials.3 The judges also not
infrequently, either lawfully or unlawfully, ordered the jury to
return a special verdict, and enforced their orders by threats, by
',Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) 140.
2 Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure (1922) 95; Morgan, A Brief History
of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories (1923) 32 YALE LAW JouR-
NAL, 588; Panel v. Moor (1553) 1 Plow. 91; Dowman's Case (1586) 9 Coke,
*7b.
1 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (3d ed. 1922) 225, 226.
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punishment or by granting a new trial., The practice also grew
up of quizzing the jury not only when they had returned a special
verdict, but also occasionally when they had returned a general
verdict: The English juries from time to time resisted these
attempts to compel them to account for their verdicts; and in the
end this resistance has apparently resulted in the complete ac-
ceptance of their view by the English courts. Under the present
English practice, it is the privilege of the jury to decline to find
any other than a general verdict, even though the judge requests
them to give a special verdict ; and in the absence of consent of
the parties and of the jury it is not proper for the trial judge to
direct the jury to return answers to special questions with their
general verdict 7. After a general verdict has been returned, the
trial judge is not entitled to ask any further questions of the jury
for the purpose of ascertaining the grounds for the verdict8
The general tendency in this country has been to increase the
power of the jury beyond all English precedents9; but in respect
to special verdicts and special interrogatories we have actually
decreased the power of the jury to a considerable extent. The
old custom of the English judges of quizzing a jury who had re-
turned an unexpected verdict was apparently adopted early in the
judicial history of 'Massachusetts. In Pierce i. Woodward 0 it is
stated that "where the judge is surprised by the verdict, it is not
unusual to ask the jury upon what principle it was found". Some
of the other New England states, relying on the Massachusetts
precedents, soon adopted the same practice.1 This practice was
of such practical utility that it was early extended so as to
allow special questions to be submitted to the jury, answers to
which were to be returned with the general verdict.12
In New York the practice of submitting to the jury special in-
terrogatories to which answers were to be returned with the
general verdict was sanctioned by the Supreme Court of that
4 Thayer, op. cit. supra note 1, at 217, 218.
5 Morgan, op cit. supra note 2, at 591; 2 Pollock and Maitland, Hintory
of English Law (2d ed. 1898) 631.
3 Mayor and Burgesses of Devises v. Clark (1835, K. B.) 3 Ad. & E. 500.
7 Walton v. Potter et al. (1841, C. P.) 3 Man. and G. 411, 433.
sBrow . Bristol and Exeter Ry. (1861, Exch.) 4 L. T. (z,. s.) 830;
Arnold v. Jeffreys [1914] 1 K. B. 512.
9 Thayer, loc. cit. supra note 1; Sunderland, The Inefficncy of the Ainer-
ican Jury (1915) 13 MIlcH. L. REv. 302.
30 (1828, Mlass.) 6 Pick. 206, 208; see also Hi v. Drury (1827, Blass.) 5
Pick. 296; Parrott et al. v. Thacher et al. (1830, Dass.) 0 Pick. 425; Dorr
v. Fewno (1832, Mass.) 12 Pick. 521.
11 Smith v. Putney (1841) 18 Mle. 87; Walker v. Sawyer (1842) 13 N. H.
191; S mith v. Powers (1844) 15 N. H. 546.
12 Gordon v. Wilkins (1841) 20 Mle. 134; Graves v. Washington Marine
Insurance Co. (1866, Mlass.) 12 Allen, 391; Cumnmings and Co. v. Aldrich
(1854) 29 N. H. 63; Wheeler v. Schroeder (1856) 4 R. I. 333; Spaulding
v. Robbins et al. (1869) 42 Vt. 90.
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state prior to the adoption of the Code of Procedure of 1848.1"
That code contained two sections" authorizing a continuance of
this practice. These two sections are in part as follows: "the
court may direct the jury to find a special verdict in writing,
upon all or any of the issues; or may instruct them, if they render
a general verdict, to find upon particular questions of fact, to be
stated in writing, and may direct a written finding thereon."
"The special verdict or finding shall be filed with the clerk, and
entered upon the minutes." "Where a special finding of facts
shall be inconsistent with the general verdict, the former shall
control the latter, and the court shall give judgment accordingly."
These sections, in common with most of the other provisions
of that Code, have been copied, either directly or indirectly, in
a more or less modified form, by a majority of the American state
legislatures, and have been incorporated into their various codes
of civil procedure. The statutes in force at the present time in
twenty-nine of the American states and in the Territory of Alaska
contain express provisions relating to special findings by the
jury in addition to the general verdict. In twenty-two of these
states and in the Territory of Alaskal", the submission of inter-
rogatories, answers to which are to be returned with the general
verdict, is discretionary with the court by the language of the
statute, notwithstanding a request by one or both of the parties.
The phraseology of these statutes differs to some extent, but they
are all substantially to the effect that the court "may" require
the jury to find specially on one or more questions of fact in any
case in which they return a general verdict. The language of
the statutes of the remaining seven states,16 as to the court's duty
when a party requests the submission of interrogatories, is man-
datory. These statutes likewise differ in their phraseology, but
13 McMasters et al. v. Westchester County Mut. Ins. Co. (1841, N. Y.
Sup. Ct.) 25 Wend. 379.
14 N. Y. Laws, 71 Sess., 1848, ch. 379, sees. 216, 217.
ISAlaska, Comp. Laws, 1913, sec. 1037; Arkansas, Crawford and Moses
Digest, 1921, see. 1303; Arizona, Civ. Code, 1913, par. 543; California,
Deering C. C. P. 1923, sec. 625; Colorado, Comp. Laws, 1921, C. C. P. sec.
219; Idaho, Comp. Sts. 1919, sec. 6861; Kentucky, Carroll's Codes of
Practice, 1919, sec. 327; Minnesota, Gen. Sts. 1913, sec. 7808; Montana,
Rev. Codes, 1921, sec. 9361; Nebraska, Comp. Sts. 1922, see. 8804; Nevada,
Rev. Laws 1919, sec. 5222; New York C. P. A. 1921, sec. 459; North
Carolina, Cons. Sts. 1919, sec. 587; North Dakota, Comp. Laws, 1913,
sec. 7633; Oklahoma, Comp. Sts. Ann. 1921, sec. 552; Oregon, Laws, 1920,
see. 154; South Carolina, C. C. P. 1922, see. 542; South Dakota, Rev. Code,
1919, sec. 2520; Utah, Comp. Laws, 1917, sec. 6821; Washington, Reming-
ton's Comp. Sts. 1922, sec. 364; West Virginia, Barne's Code Ann. 1923,
ch. 131, sec. 5; Wisconsin, Sts. 1921, sec. 2858; Wyoming, Comp. Sts. 1920,
sec. 5780.
"6Illinois, Smith-Hurd's Rev. Sts. 1923, ch. 110, sec. 79; Indiana, Burn's
Ann. Sts. 1914, sec. 572; Iowa, Comp. Code, 1919, sec. 7523; Kansas, Rev.
Sts. 1923, ch. 60, sec. 2918; Michigan, Comp. Laws, 1915, sec. 12611; Ohio,
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are substantially to the effect that, at the request of a party, the
trial court "sh '7 direct the jury to find on particular questions
of fact in addition to a general verdict.
Of the tweity-nine states in which the statutes make the sub-
mission of interrogatories discretionary with the trial court, it
has been held in three, namely, California, Oregon and Washing-
ton, that in so far as a refusal to submit interrogatories is con-
cerned, the discretion is absolute and cannot be reviewed on ap-
peal.' s The submission of improper or misleading interrogatories
is obviously a more serious matter than a refusal to submit proper
interrogatories; and no state has gone so far as to hold that there
is no review of a submission of improper interrogatories. The
Supreme Court of Oregon has apparently gone as far as any
court in the direction of making the decision of the trial court
final. As to the latter question, that court in White v. Wht Ic 0
said, "The nature and form of the particular questions are largely
within the discretion of the trial judge, and unless it is apparent
that there was a clear abuse of such discretion, or unless the
question submitted even upon immaterial or inconclusive matters
was palpably misleading as to the main issue, or could not be
answered without danger of confusion or misrepresentation, it
would not afford ground for reversal."
According to the weight of authority and what the writer be-
lieves to be the better view, the discretion vested by this group
of statutes in the trial court is a discretion subject to review
either as to the submission, or as to the refusal to submit inter-
rogatories; but the action of the trial court is reversible error only
in case of a clear showing that it has abused its discretion by
acting arbitrarily.0  In the seven states" in which the statutes
Throceknorton, Gen. Code Ann. 1921, sec. 11463; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws,
1923, sec. 4983.
7The constraining word used in the statutes of Illinois and Iowa is
"must" instead of "shall".
"sEaton v. Southern Pao. Co. (1913) 22 Calif. App. 461, 134 Pac. 801;
Swift v. Mudkey (1836) 14 Or. 59, 12 Pac. 7G; Fox v. Tift (1910) 57 Or.
268, 111 Pac. 51; Wallace v. Avwricau Life Izs. Co. (1924) 111 Or. 510,
225 Pac. 192; Pencil v. Home Is. Co. (1892) 3 Wash. 485, 23 Pac. 1031;
Acres v. Frederick and Nelson, Izc. (1914) 79 Wash. 402, 140 Pac. 370.
19 (1899) 34 Or. 141, 159, 55 Pac. 645, 650.
20 Burke v. McDonald (1890) 2 Idaho, 646, 33 Pac. 49; Fodclj v. Northcra
Pae. Ry. (1912) 21 Idaho, 713, 123 Pac. 835; huis v. Chicago M. and St.
P. Ry. (1889) 40 Minn. 273, 41 N. W. 1040; Moody v. Canadian INorth l
By. (1923) 156 Minn. 211, 194 N. W. 639; Chicago, St. Paid, M. and 0.
Ry. v. Lagerkrans (1902) 65 Neb. 566, 91 N. W. 358; Man gua -e. BaUion
Beel and Champion AZi?& Co. (1897) 15 Utah, 534, 50 Pac. 834; F. Dohraci
Co. v. Niagra Fire Ins. Co. (1897) 96 Wis. 38, 71 N. W. 69. The statute3
of West Virginia expressly provide that the action of the trial court on a
motion to submit interrogatories shall be subject to review. Sce Gupra
note 15.
21 Supra note 16.
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are mandatory in form providing that, at the request of a party
the court "shall" or "must" submit interrogatories, a refusal by
a trial court to submit them is not reversible error unless the
questions were seasonably submitted, were proper in form and
substance, and were not covered by others which were sub-
mitted.22 Under both groups of statutes the court may submit
interrogatories to the jury of its own motion23 but need not do
so.2 4 The state statutes relating to interrogatories are not within
the meaning of the Federal Conformity Act, and hence are not
applicable to the Federal courts. But at least two Federal
courts relying on the New England precedents, 0 independent of
any statute,2 7 have sanctioned the practice of submitting inter-
rogatories.
Statutes authorizing interrogatories have occasionally been at-
tacked on the ground that they abridge the constitutional right
of trial by jury. In Walker v. New Mexico, and S. P. R. R." it
was contended that an act of the legislature of the then Territory
of New Mexico providing for special interrogatories violated the
Seventh Amendment. In answering this contention the United
States Supreme Court 29 said: ",We are clearly of opinion that
this territorial statute does not infringe any constitutional pro-
vision, and that it is within the power of the legislature of a
territory to provide that on a trial of a common-law action the
court niay, in addition to the general verdict require specific an-
swers to special interrogatories; and, when a conflict is found
between the two, render such judgment as the answers to the
questions compel." Obviously such statutes do not prevent the
jury from passing on disputed questions of fact. They do pro-
vide a means of checking up the verdict and hence have a tend-
ency to make the division of functions of court and jury more
22 Chicago & Alton R. B. v. Harrington (1901) 192 Ill. 9, 61 N. E. 622;
Clegg v. Waterbury et al. (1882) 88 Ind. 21; Bower v. Bofoer (1895) 142
Ind. 194, 41 N. E. 523; Jones v. Annis (1891) 47 Kan. 478, 28 Pac. 156;
Zucker v. Karpeles (1891) 88 Mich. 413, 50 N. W. 373; Cleveland C. C.
,and, St. L. Ry. v. Village of St. Bernard (1899) 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 296, 10
0. C. D. 415.
23 Lowman v. Sheets (1890) 124 Ind. 416, 24 N. E. 351; Miles v. Schrunk
(1908) 139 Iowa, 563, 117 N. W. 971; Oliver v. Morawetz (1897) 97 Wis.
332, 72 N. W. 877.
24 Chicago & Alton B. R. v. Elmore (1889) 32 Ill. App. 418.
25 Indianapolis and St. L. R. R. v. Horst (1876) 93 U. S. 291.
26 Supra note 12. Rhode Island is the only New England state that has
a statute on the subject, and in Rhode Island the practice of submitting
interrogatories antedated the statute. *
27 Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. Lindsay (1912, C. C. A. 7th) 201 Fed.
836; Victor-American Fuel Co. v. Peccarick (1913, C. C. A. 8th) 209 Fed.
568; see also Walker v. New Mexico, and S. P. B. B. (1897) 165 U. S. 593,
17 Sup. Ct. 421.
28 Supra note 27.
29 Supra note 27, at 598, 17 Sup. Ct. at 423.
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effective by taking away from the jury some of its power to take
the law into its own hand. But, in so far as civil cases are con-
cerned, this power is not2, and it is submitted, should not be,
protected by constitutional safeguards.
The difference between a special verdict and special findings
in response to interrogatories is clearly brought out in the fol-
lowing extract from an opinion of the Iowa Supreme Court, 3
"There is . . . a manifest difference between a speeial ver-
dict and the finding of the facts in answer to interrogatories pro-
pounded to the jury. A special verdict is in lieu of a general
verdict, and its design is to exhibit all the ultimate facts, and
leave the legal conclusions entirely to the court. . . .1Find-
ings of fact in answer to interrogatories do not dispense with the
general verdict. . . . A special verdict covers all the issues
in the case, while an answer to a special interrogation may re-
spond to but a single inquiry, pertaining merely to one issue,
though essential to the general verdict." The great objection to
the special verdict is the technical manner in which it must be
formulated. Under our present system it must be "built up out
of the facts shown in evidence, and that when so constructed it
must on its face, taken in connection with the pleadings, consti-
tute a technically sufficient foundation of fact for a judgment.
Nothing else is to be looked to. All controverted facts not found
therein are to be deemed non-existent. This means that either
omissions of material facts, or employment of conclusions of law
or matters of evidence instead of ultimate facts or the use of
ambiguous and uncertain language will destroy the verdict as
the foundation for a judgment." -2 These objections have very
little force as applied to special findings accompanied by a general
verdict, as judgment is entered on the general verdict in all cases
in which the special finding does not state facts requiring a dif-
ferent result.
Most of the general principles as to the form of interrogatories
are elementary and are fairly stated by the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors as follows, "They should be so clear and concise
as to be readily understood and answered by the jury. Each
question should call for a finding of but a single fact. When
practical, each question should be so framed as to call for a
z.O Pittsburgh C. G. and St. L. Ry. v. Smith (1904) 207 Ill. 486, 69 N. E.
873; Citizens St. R. R. v. Jolly (1903) 161 Ind. 80, 67 N. E. 935; Adams
Adr 'r. v. Louisville and N. R. R. (1885) 82 Ky. 603; Scott, op. cit. vnpra
note 2, at 96, 97, 106.
33 Morbey v. Chicago N. W. Ry. (1902) 116 Iowa, 84, 39, 89 N. W. 105,
107. The courts citations of authorities are omitted.
32 Sunderland, Verdicts, Ge2zcraZ and Specid (1920) 29 YAI= LAW Joun-
NAL, 253, 262. Professor Sunderland ably argues for a change in the method
of drafting pleadings which will enable the pleadings themselve3 to be em-
ployed without change of form as the findings of the special verdict.
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categorical answer. Each question should ask for the finding
of a fact and never for a conclusion of law. No question should
ask for the finding of a purely evidential fact nor of an uncontro-
verted fact. Although not wholly covering, nor necessarily con-
trolling, the determination of any issue framed, the fact sought
to be elicited must be pertinent to some issue, and one which may
be of material weight in deciding it. No interrogatory should be
permitted, the response to which cannot serve either to limit or
explain a general verdict or aid in the proceeding for a subsequent
review of the verdict or judgment which may be rendered." "I
It is held in a few jurisdictions that direct pertinent questions
within'the issues should be submitted, if requested, even though
the most favorable answers to them would not control a general
verdict in favor of the adverse party.,4 But the majority and
better view is that only those questions should be submitted which,
if answered most favorably to the party requesting them, would
be inconsistent with a general verdict for his adversary." In
some jurisdictions each question is tested separately so that,
standing by itself, it must call for an answer which would con-
trol a general verdict for the adverse party.," Such a test seems
to limit unduly the usefulness of interrogatories by making it
difficult, if not impossible, for the party sustaining the affirmative
of several issues to use them. Under such circumstances it is
submitted that it would be much better to permit the use of sev-
eral short questions which, when considered together, would call
for answers controlling a general verdict for the adverse party,
even though each question when considered alone would not have
that effect.
It is improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that if
the general verdict is for the party submitting interrogatories
they need not be answered.37  In Rhode Island it has been held
33 Freedman v. New York, N. H. and H. R. R. (1908) 81 Conn. 601, 614,
71 Atl. 901, 906.
34Brown Land Co. v. Lehman (1907) 134 Iowa, 712, 112 N. W. 185;
Atchison, T. and S. F. R. R. v. Ayers (1895) 56 Kan. 176, 42 Pac. 722.
35 Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Co. (1910) 156 Calif. 499, 111
Pac. 534; Chicago Anderson Pressed-Brick Co. v. Reinneiger (1892) 140
Ill. 334, 29 N. E. 1106; First Nat. Bank of North Bend v. Miltonberger
(1892) 33 Neb. 847, 51 N. W. 232.
36Fort Wayne Cooperage Co. v. Page (1908) 170 Ind. 585, 84 N. E. 145;
Tyler v. Wight et al. (1915) 188 Mich. 561, 155 N. W. 353.
37 In Pitzer v. Indianapolis, P. and C. Ry. (1881) 80 Ind. 569, 572,
Elliott, C. J. said: "There are strong reasons supporting the position that
a court should not be allowed to submit interrogatories with instruction
that if the general verdict is for the party submitting them, they need not
be answered. In close cases it would induce weak jurors, and such there
sometimes are, to yield rather than undertake the labor of answering long
and difficult interrogatories; it would induce ingenious counsel to frame
many and perplexing interrogatories in the hope of driving the jurors to
their side, in order to escape a laborious and irksome task."
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to be proper for the trial court to inform the jury of the legal
effect of a certain answer to a question submitted to them for a
special finding28  But the majority rule, and the one which seems
more consonant with the purpose of these statutes, is that an
instruction informing the jury of the effect of a stated answer
upon the ultimate result of the controversary should not be
given. In Coats v. Town of Stanton,o Mr. Justice Pinney, of
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in stating the reason for the
latter view, said, "The jury had no right to be informed how any
particular answer to a special question would affect the case, or
what judgment would follow in consequence of it, for to impart
such information would almost necessarily defeat the object in-
tended to be secured by a special verdict. The object of the ]aw
is to secure fair and impartial answers to such questions, free
from bias or prejudice in favor of either party or in favor of or
against a particular result, and to guard against the danger of
the result being affected or controlled by favor or sympathy, or
by immaterial considerations." Following the same line of rea-
soning, but with less justification, some courts have held that it
is reversible error to charge the jury that the special findings
must conform to the general verdict.' It is submitted that this
view is too strict and is likely unduly to hamper the trial judge
in his attempt to impress upon the jury the necessity of giving
serious consideration to the answering of each question.
Where there is evidence bearing on a material interrogatory
which is submitted, and the jury fails to answer it, or returns
an answer consisting of "we don't know" or an evasive or an
equivocal answer together with a general verdict, the court should
require the jury to retire and return a direct answer. -2 But if
the court could have properly refused to submit the question in
the first instance, it is not error for it to refuse to compel the
jury to give a categorical answerA An answer consisting of
"we don't know" or a similar expression accepted by the court
3- Smith v. Rhode Island Co. (1916) 39 R. I. 146, 98 AtI. 1.
3 Taylor v. Davarm (1916) 191 Mich. 243, 157 N. W. 572; Ch q ti v.
Hauert (1917) 164 Wis. 624, 160 N. W. 1061.
40 (1895) 90 Wis. 130, 136, 62 N. W. 619, 621.
-' Coffeyville Vitrified Brick Co. v. Zimmcrnman (1900) 61 Ran. 750, 60
Pac. 1064; Mechanics' Bank v. Barnes (1891) SG Mich. 632, 49 N. W. 475;
contra: Capital City Bank v. Wakefield (1891) 83 Iowa, 40, 48 N. W. 1059.
42 Cleveland, C. C. and I. Ry. v. Asbury (1889) 120 Ind. 289, 22 N. E.
140; Atchison T. and S. F. R. R. v. Campbell (1876) 10 Kan. 200; Stezard
v. Henningsen Produce Co. (1913) 88 Kan. 521, 129 Pac. 181; Rathbuzn v.
Parker (1897) 113 Mich. 594, 72 N. W. 31; Redford -e. Spokane St. Ry.
(1894) 9 Wash. 55, 36 Pac. 10S5.
-3 City of Izdianapolis v. Keelcy (1906) 167 Ind. 510, 79 N. E. 499; Cify
of Wyandotte v. Gibson, Adm. (1881) 25 Ran. 230; Banncr Tobacco Co. v.
Jenison (1882) 48 Mich. 459, 12 N. W. 055; N"ational Refining Co. v.
Miller (1891) 1 S. D. 548, 47 N. W. 962.
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without objection is equivalent to a finding against the party hav-
ing the burden of proof.44
Of the thirty American jurisdictions 4" which have statutes re-
lating to special interrogatories, all except Arizona and Rhode
Island expressly provide that, if a special finding of fact is in-
consistent with a general verdict, the former controls and the
court may give judgment accordingly." But the courts have
been rather reluctant to set aside general verdicts and enter judg-
ment on special findings, and in interpreting this provision they
have made the test of inconsistency a strict one. The usual state-
ment of this test is that the special finding will overthrow the
general finding only when the antagonism is apparent on the face
of the record and is beyond the possibility of being removed by
any evidence admissible under the issues.," In determining this
question the court will consider only the pleadings, the general
verdict, and the answers to the interrogatories.-" The majority
rule is that where special findings are contradictory and incon-
sistent with themselves they destroy each other and cannot effect
the general verdict.4 This rule seems to savor more of meta-
physical logic than of common sense. In cases of this type, and
also in cases of the preceding type, namely, where the special
findings are inconsistent with the general verdict, it is submitted
that there is a practical demonstration that the jury has misun-
derstood thejnstructions, has deliberately disregarded them or
has made a clerical error in answering the interrogatories. Con-
sequently the proper remedy should be to resubmit the case to
the jury with appropriate instructions. If this is no longer
possible, judgment should be rendered on the special findings, if
44 Hinze v. City of Iola (1914) 92 Kan. 779, 142 Pac. 947; Minor v.
Stevens (1911) 65 Wash. 423, 118 Pac. 313, and cases cited in Ann. Cas.
1916 B, 284, note.
4 5 Supra notes 15 and 1q.
46 Iowa Comp. Code, 191"9, sec. 7524 adds "or set aside the verdict and
findings, as justice may require."
47 American Car and Foundry Co. v. Vance (1912) 177 Ind. 78, 97 N. E.
327; Devine v. Federal Life Ins. Co. (1911) 250 Ill. 203, 95 N. E. 174;
Osbumm v. Atchison T. and S. F. R. R. (1907) 75 Kan. 746, 90 Pac. 289;
Kafka v. Union Stockyards Co. (1907) 78 Neb. 140, 110 N. W. 672; Smith
v. Atchison T. and S. F. R. R. (1914) 19 N. M. 247, 142 Pac. 150.
4 8Drake v. Justice Gold Mining Co. (1904) 32 Colo. 259, 75 Pac. 912;
Indiana Ry. v. Maurer (1903) 160 Ind. 25, 66 N. E. 156; Evansville and
S. L Traction Co. v. Spiegel (1911) 49 Ind. App. 412, 94 N. E. 718; Devine
v. Federal Life Ins. Co., supra note 47; Schauer v. Bodenheimer (1912)
150 Wis. 550, 137 N. W. 785.
49Drake v. Justice Gold Mining Co., supra note 48; Childress v. Lako
Erie and W. R. R. (1914) 182 Ind. 251, 105 N. E. 467; Di Palma v. Wein-
man (1911) 16 N. M. 302, 121 Pac. 38; Donnell v. City of Greensboro (1913)
164 N. C. 330, 80 S. E. 377.
60 Tatlow v. Bacon (1915) 95 Kan. 695, 149 Pac. 745; MeManus v. Thing
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they are consistent with themselves. If they are irreconcilably
inconsistent with themselves, a new trial should be granted."
The practice of submitting interrogatories is subject to two
abuses. First, their form may be such as to mislead the jury,
and secondly, an excessive number of questions may confuse the
jury. There can be little doubt that the privilege of submitting
interrogatories has been abused occasionally, 2 and that this abuse
in some cases has resulted in entrapping the jury into an uninten-
tional error. Although both under the statutes providing that
the court "may" and under those providing that the court "shall"
submit interrogatories, at the request of a party, trial judges
have power to revise, revamp, and rearrange interrogatories and
strike out repetitions and immaterial qdestions, naturally they
have felt less hesitancy in doing so when acting under statutes
of the discretionary type. Three states which have had statutes
of the mandatory type have amended them so as to make them
discretionaryu3 ; and two other states have amended statutes of the
mandatory type by expressly limiting the number of questions."
The statutes of three states require the questions to be submitted
to the adverse party or his attorneys before the argument to the
jury is commenced. Such provisions are perhaps helpful in
remedying these abuses; but in the last analysis the main reliance
must rest on the personal character and training of the trial
judges.
Some of the advantages of submitting interrogat9ries are the
following. (1) They provide a method of checking up the cor-
rectness of the general verdict. This is undoubtedly their chief
(1911) 208 Mass. 55' 94 N. E. 293; Loy v. Northerc Pac. R,. (1912) 03
Wash. 33, 122 Pac. 372.
53'McEwan v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1914) 23 Calif. App. 694, 139
Pac. 242; Willis v. Sknzner (1913) 89 Kan. 145, 130 Pac. 673; Colc v.
Atchison T. and S. F. R. R. (1914) 92 Kan. 132, 139 Pac. 1177; Healey v.
New York, N. H. and H. R. R. (1897) 20 R. I. 136, 37 Atl. 676.
52Some examples of the submission of an excessive number of inter-
rogatories follow: one hundred and thirty-six in Atchison T. and S. F.
R. R. v. Cone (1887) 37 Kan. 567, 15 Pac. 499; one hundred and ten in
Atchison T. and S. F. R. R. v. Browa (1885) 33 Kan. 757, 7 Pae. 571;
fifty-three in Harbaugh v. Cicott (1876) 33 Mich. 241; twenty in FiU- v.
Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. (1891) 83 Iowa, 253, 48 N. W. 1031.
53 California, Deering Code of Civ. Proc. 1923, sec. 625, Historical Note;
Kentucky, Carroll's Codes of Practice, 1919, sec. 327, Editorial Note; Ofla-
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82 Pac. 648, 649 with Comp. Sts. Ann. 1921, sec. 552.
G Kansas, Rev. Sts. 1923, ch. 60, sec. 2918. "Provided, That no one party
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than ten special questions." Michigan, Comp. Laws, 1915, EcC. 12G11.
"Provided such special questions shall not exceed five in number and shall
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st Colorado, Illinois and Iowa. See supra notes 15 and 16.
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function; and the answers to them in many cases have furnished
conclusive proof that the jury misunderstood the instructions,
deliberately disregarded them or erred in applying them to the
facts found. (2) They compel the jury to give a detailed con-
sideration to important issues. Jurors are not accustomed to
sifting issues, and are quite likely to jump at a general conclusion
without methodically considering the evidence bearing on the
real issues involved. Special interrogatories are especially valu-
able in that they compel the jury to consider the more important
issues in their relation to the ultimate rights of the parties. (3)
Answers to special interrogatories may show that some errors
were not prejudicial and provide a basis for curing others. It
not infrequently happens that the jury will find a certain fact to
have been proved which in law is an insuperable barrier to a
recovery in accord with their generael verdict. In such cases the
error is often corrected and the ultimate rights of the parties
settled at the trial without the expense and delay of a new trial.
Less frequently a special finding shows that certain errors were
not prejudicial. Thus a finding of a particular issue in favor of
the appellant may show that an erroneous exclusion of evidence
as to that issue was not prejudicial, or a finding against the ap-
pellant on a particular issue may show that an error in an instruc-
tion or in the denial of a requested instruction was harmless.
(4) Interrogatories have a salutary effect on the morale of the
jury. The fact that the cloak of secrecy will be lifted and the
court, the parties, and the public will see its findings on particular
questions of fact, will probably make the jury more conscious of
its responsibility. A jury which would on general principles re-
turn a large and unwarranted verdict where a railway company
was a defendant or a pretty woman was a plaintiff might well
shrink from a specific finding which it felt not authorized by the
evidence.
No one would claim that special interrogatories will prevent
or invalidate all perverse verdicts, for obviously a verdict of dis-
honest or corrupt jurors who had sufficient intellectual capacity
to appreciate the effects of their answers to interrogatories and
to harmonize them with their general verdict, would still be un-
assailable. It would be much more difficult for them to do this,
however, than it would be if no interrogatories were submitted;
and it is believed that by requiring the jury to return findings on
particular questions of fact, we may fairly expect to escape most
of the verdicts which are primarily the result of sympathy, prej-
udice and passion. The number of chance verdicts will also be
materially reduced, for interrogatories compel the jury to do
more than toss a coin and keep still about it, if their verdict is to
stand. The absence of special interrogatories in modern English
practice is doubtless primarily due to the fact that the English
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judges still exercise their common law power of giving liberal
aid to the jury in their endeavor to reach a just conclusion on
matters of fact. But by constitutional provision, legislation, or
judicial decision this power has been taken away from the trial
judge in two-thirds of the American jurisdictions.rQ Some'cheek
must be imposed to prevent a jury from yielding to impulse and
returning a general verdict in disregard of the law or from ignor-
ing the fair weight of the evidence. Otherwise the parties will
be subjected to "a government by jury instead of a government
by law." 5-
u Sunderland, op. cit. supra note 9.
37 Emery, Goverinenwt by Jury (1915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 205.
